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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

Case Number: 20 I 60477-CA

PRESTON MICHAEL
COWLlSHAW
Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
Appeal from a conviction for kidnapping, a second degree felony, failure to
respond at the command of police, a third degree felony and theft, a second degree
felony in the Second District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable, Ernie W.Jones,
Judge, presiding.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence where no witness
identified Mr. Cowlishaw as the perpetrator or as the person who stole the
vehicle.
a. Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of
the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is
'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach []
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."' State v.
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Briggs, 2008 UT 75,
UT 2,

,r 5,

,r 10,

197 P.3d 628 (quoting State v. Gordon, 2004

84 P.3d 1167 (quoting State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786,

786-87 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987)))).
b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. Cowlishaw argued that there was
insufficient evidence due to the State's failure to identify him. R.
111-12.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The texts of the relevant Constitutional provisions and statutes are m
Addendum A and B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State charged Mr. Cowlishaw onJune 26, 2015. R. 1-2. On April 14,
2016, the case was tried to the court, who convicted Mr. Cowlishaw that same
date. R. 188-331. On May 25, 2016, the court sentenced Mr. Cowlishaw to
prison. R. 119-28. Mr. Cowlishaw timely appealed the conviction to this court on
June 8, 2016. R. 139-40.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On June 24, 2015, Officer Joel Green received a call of a domestic
disturbance occurring at a toll booth in Ogden, Utah involving a grey vehicle. R.
196. He showed up on the scene, observed a grey vehicle and flipped a U-tum to
get behind it. R. 198. The car stopped briefly and then took off at a high rate of
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speed. R. 198-99. The officer pursued, activating his lights. R. 198-99. The officer
lost the car at one point, then decided to check a field with tire tracks in it. R. 201.
As he ran through the field, he heard a woman screaming for help down an
embankment. R. 201-03. He looked down and saw the vehicle "wedged between
the scrub oak and brush." R. 203-04. When the officer approached her, she said
that "he wouldn't let her go" and that he had been holding her "all night, all day."
R. 201. Officer Green, however, had no idea how many people were in the vehicle
or who was the driver. R. 213.
Officers brought in canine units and set up a perimeter, but were
unsuccessful in finding the driver. R. 207. They interviewed the woman, Rachel
Jones, who told them she had been kidnapped by a person named Preston. R. 213,
226. She could not remember his last name. R. 214, 226. Deputy Michael
Aschinger interviewed Jones, who showed him a text message saying, "Help, I
have been kidnapped." R. 223. He also saw a text that said, "If you are interested
in making some more$$ tonight, call me quick." R. 225. Jones had warrants for

her arrest for drug possession and was taken into custody. R. 225, 272. Aschinger
also observed that the car in the embankment was a "silver Nissan hatchback." R.
223.
Safwan Saad testified that his car, a sky blue 2010 Nissan Versa, was taken
from his work when he left it briefly to run inside the office. R. 229-31. He did not
see who took it, but when it was recovered, he did not recognize any of the items
in it, which included garbage and food items. R. 234-36.
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Sharon Leinweber testified that she was working at a toll booth when a
silver car pulled up. R. 241. A girl jumped out and ran toward the office
screaming, and video of this encounter was shown to the court. R. 241, State's Ex.
31 and 32. Leinweber asked the driver, a "white Caucasian with a baseball cap"
what was going on. R. 242. He responded that the girl was drunk and that he
would be back. R. 242. He backed up the car and followed the girl. R. 242-45.
Leinweber called 911 and believed, but did not see, that the girl got back into the
car. R. 247-48.
Rachel Jones testified that she met "Preston" once or twice before at her
parents' home. R. 251. On the date of this incident, she said that he asked her if
she wanted to get some food. R. 253. The two of them picked up food at Burger
King in Salt Lake City and after, he continued to drive north past her house,
saying he wanted to "get to know me more." R. 253.
As the two passed Lagoon, he asked for Jones's phone. R. 254. He then

took it from her and removed its battery, saying it was a distraction. R. 254. He
drove crazily and fast, which scaredJones. R. 255. She asked him to stop to swim
or bowl but he did not do it. R. 255-56. They eventually stopped at a church near
an elementary school and after he made her remove her shoes, he allowed her to
use her phone. R. 256-5 7. She called her mother and when she said she wanted to
go home, he again took the phone from her. R. 25 7.
He became sincere and told Jones he would take her home if she got back
in the car. R. 258. She got back in. R. 258. As they continued to drive, she thought
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he said ''crazy things" and alternated emotions from calm to anger. R. 259. They
stopped another time at a gas station/ restaurant. R. 260.
Eventually, they pulled up to a toll booth. R. 261. When they stopped,
Jones testified she jumped out of the car. R. 262. She ran toward the office
screaming for help and when no one was there, she turned and ran up the hill,
eventually collapsing. R. 262. He came back and told her to get in. R. 262. She
agreed. R. 262.
When the police got behind them, he said that "[t]his can't happen" and
sped off, running a red light. R. 263. He crashed into a tree and then tried to pull
her out of the car. R. 263. Because his door was pinned, he climbed over Jones
and took off. R. 264. She was in the car with him approximately six hours. R. 259.
Officer Green told his superiors that he worried his case was not too strong.
R. 210. Particularly, he was worried about the victim's willingness to cooperate. R.
210. Consequently, he obtained a Burger King cup from the vehicle after Jones
told him Preston had been drinking from it. R. 211. Fingerprint analysis of the cup
and of prints obtained from the driver's side window came back to Mr. Cowlishaw.

R. 287-89.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State failed to present sufficient evidence of all three offenses. No
witness identified Mr. Cowlishaw as the person who kidnapped Jones or who was
driving and failed to respond to the police. While Jones mentioned a "Preston," at
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no point did she say Mr. Cowlishaw was that person. Police never observed or
apprehended the driver. Nor did any of the State's evidence establish that Mr.
Cowlishaw took the vehicle or that the vehicle recovered was even the vehicle
taken from Saad. No witness observed the theft and no witness testified that :Mr.
Cowlishaw illegally took possession of it. Additionally, no physical evidence linked

Mr. Cowlishaw to the crime enough to say that he was the person who committed
any of these offenses. The trial court erred in denying the motion for directed
verdict.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
The trial court erroneously denied the motion
for directed verdict given that no witness
identified Mr. Cowlishaw as the driver of the
vehicle or as the person who conun.itted the
crime, nor did they identify the car stolen as
the sam.e car recovered.

During trial, no witness specifically identified Mr. Cowlishaw as the person
who kidnapped Jones, who failed to respond to police or who stole a motor
vehicle. Nor did the State ever identify Saad's stolen vehicle as the same one police
recovered.Jones was asked one question: ''When did you see--and the defendant
is in the courtroom today; is that correct? A. Yes." R. 252. But at no point did she
say that the person who sat in the courtroom was the person who committed this
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offense. Jones herself only referred to a "Preston'' once and she made no other
statements of identification. R. 25 7.1
Defense counsel pointed this out to the court. "No one actually identified
[M:r. Cowlishaw] today," he said. R. 298. Jones never pointed him out. R. 298.
Nor did the toll booth operator identify him. R. 298. As Mr. Cowlishaw argued to
the court, " [n] either [witness] was asked specifically if this individual sitting here is
the individual involved in this case." R. 298.
The evidence did not remedy the identification problem. Deputy Green
testified it was too dark for him to see the driver, Deputy Aschinger did not see the
driver, nor did Mr. Saad see who took his vehicle. R. 213, 234, 298.Jones never
stated "Preston's" last name, either to the police or in court. R. 299. As for the
fingerprints, even that evidence was not conclusive. R. 299.
The State agreed it failed to formally identify Mr. Cowlishaw. But it
contended that Jones "mentioned him as Preston several times" and "nodded
towards" him such that formal identification was "not necessary." R. 302-03. It
also argued that it did not need to formally identify him because fingerprint
evidence put him in the vehicle. R. 303.
The court rejected the identification argument. It agreed that• Mr. Saad
"never identified the car that we see in the photographs 15, 16, and 17 as being his
car." R. 305. But the court found that circumstantially, because Mr. Saad came up
1 The

State also asked her, "did you know the defendant, Preston Cowlishaw?" to
which she replied "I had met him shortly once or twice, maybe three times." R.
251.
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and looked at a car which was "completely totaled" which was "consistent with the
condition of the car" in the photographs, the two cars were the same. R. 305-06.
The court also believed there was no question "that the defendant was the
one involved in the theft of this motor vehicle based on the location of the
fingerprints." R. 306.
As for his identification, the court found that while Jones "may not have
come out and made an identification" she said the man driving was "Preston." R.
306. "[I]t just so happens that the defendant's first name is Preston. So while she
may not have pointed to him and made a formal identification in court, I think
when you couple the fingerprints and both of them being in the car, and him
having the name Preston, I think that's enough to establish the identification." R.
306.
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIBNT EVIDENCE THAT MR. COWLISHAW
WAS THE PERSON WHO KIDNAPPED JONES OR FAILED TO
RESPOND TO POLICE WHEN NO WITNESS IDENTIFIED HIM AS
THAT PERSON.

The State never established that the person sitting at the defense tabl~
Preston Cowlishaw--was the person who kidnapped Jones or who avoided the
police. Jones only stated that she believed the person's name was Preston-she
never testified that his name was Preston Cowlishaw. Additionally, she never took
the simple step of pointing out the person in the courtroom. State v. Harringt.on,
2002-Ohio-2190,

1 12,

2002 WL 987836 (finding insufficient evidence where

witness failed to make an in-court identification). While she agreed that the
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"defendant" was in the courtroom, she did not indicate whether the defendant was

Mr. Cowlishaw. These were critical errors that created an insufficient
identification and ultimately amounted to insufficient evidence to support a
conviction.
"'A conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand."'

Stat,e v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23,

iJ 14,

210 P.3d 288. Further, "a defendant need not

adduce any evidence in his defense unless the prosecution first adduces believable
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521,524
(Utah 1983). A "motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the
State's case in chief requires the trial court to determine whether the defendant
must proceed with ... his defense." Stat,e v. Noren, 74 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985)
(citations omitted). "When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient
evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him
discharged." Utah Code Ann.§ 77-17-3; see Utah R. Crim. P. l 7(p).
This court will hold that there was insufficient evidence if "after viewing the
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted." Stat,e v. Ho!gat,e, 2000 UT
74, iJ 18, 10 P.3d 346 (quoting Stare v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)).
The State argued that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish
Mr. Cowlishaw's identity and the court agreed. The court focused on two facts:
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Jones' indication that the person was named Preston and fingerprints in the car
belonged to Mr. Cowlishaw. The two facts, taken together, the court said were
sufficient to establish his identity. R. 306.
1. A person's na.IIle as ''Preston" was not a
sufficient basis to identify Mr. Cowlishaw

However, at no point, pre-trial or otherwise, did Jones identify Mr.
Cowlishaw. The police did not do an in-person or a photo lineup. They did not
have her point to a person in court. "An uncertain or equivocal identification,
standing alone, is insufficient evidence to support a conviction." Gibson v. Stat,e, No.
01-92-00127-CR, 1993 WL 55192, at *2 (Tex. App. Mar. 4, 1993). Here, there
was no identification at all.
The fact thatJones agreed with the prosecutor's question that the defendant
was in the courtroom does not solve the problem. Jones could have picked
someone else (not Mr. Cowlishaw) in the courtroom as the person in the vehicle,
believing that person was the defendant. See Jones v. State, 1985 OK CR 14, 695
P.2d 13, 16 (insufficient evidence as to identity where witness identified defendant's
brother, who was in the courtroom, as the perpetrator). Or she could have been
agreeing that the defendant was present, but not agreeing that the defendant was
the person who committed the crime.
The fact that the perpetrator was named Preston establishes nothing in
terms of identity. The social security index reveals that for the year of Mr.
Cowlishaw's birth alone--1989-Preston was the 73 rd most popular male baby
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name in the State of Utah, having received 62 registrations. 2 The name of Preston
was too probable and insufficiently unique to positively identify Mr. Cowlishaw.
Notably, Jones did not know "Preston's" last name and while there was some
testimony that an officer received a last name from Jones's stepfather, the
stepfather never testified, nor did the officer state the last name. R. 226.
No other witness identified Mr. Cowlishaw. The State never asked the toll
booth operator if Mr. Cowlishaw was the person she spoke with. Neither police
officer interacted with the driver or observed him.
2. Fingerprint evidence did not establish that
Mr. Cowlishaw committed the crime or was
even present at that tim.e.
Additionally, the fingerprint evidence does not establish that Mr.
Cowlishaw was the person who committed these offenses. First, as defense counsel
argued to the court, fingerprint evidence has come into large disrepute. The
National Academy of Sciences, the most illustrious scientific body in the nation,
having conducted an exhaustive and unprecedented examination of latent
fingerprint analysis, concluded that fingerprint examiners "have yet to establish
either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions ... " 3 In

https:/ /ww,v.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/narncsbvstatc.cgi (search "Preston" in "1989" for
the State of Utah).
3 Strengthening Forensic Science in the United Stat.es: A Path Fonvard (The National
Academies
Press,
2009),
53,
http:/ /www.nap.edu/ openbook.php?record_id= 12589; see also ibid., 102 ("Over
the years the courts have admitted fingerprint evidence, even though this evidence
2
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reaching these conclusions, the NAS examined the standard methodology
employed by fingerprint examiners and found that it provides "only a broadly
stated framework for conducting [fingerprint] analyses," that "is not specific
enough to qualify as a validated method."-! The NAS concluded that there is no
"available scientific evidence of the validity of [the fingerprint analysis] method." 5
Accordingly, the NAS, in no uncertain terms, concluded that fingerprint
examiners are "unjustified" in claiming the ability to match a latent fingerprint to
a particular finger to the exclusion of all others in the world. 6
The state and federal courts of this nation have a long history of treating the
reports of the NAS as "authoritative works for purposes of determining generally
accepted standards within the scientific community." Com. v. Gqynor, 820 N.E.2d
233, 250 (Mass. 2005); United Stat.es v. Morrow, 374 F. Supp.2d 42, 49 (D.D.C.
2005). In light of the impartiality and expertise that are the hallmarks of the NAS,
courts, including Utah courts, have uniformly recognized that the conclusions of
the NAS regarding the scientific validity of a particular methodology are
"authoritative. "7

has made its way into the courtroom without empirical validation of the

underlying theory and/or its particular application.").
Strengthening Forensic Science, 142.
5 Ibid., 143.
6 Ibid., 142; see also ibid., 7 (recognizing that fingerprint analysis has not been
"shown to have the capacity of consistently, and with a high degree of certainty,
demonstrat[ing] a connection between evidence [i.e, a latent print] and a specific
individual or source.").
7 See, e.g., Unit,ed St,a,t,es v. LJJwe, 954 F.Supp. 401, 403 (D. Mass. 1996) ("both the
government and the defendant agree [the NRC report] is an authoritative work in

4
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In United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003) the court noted that

with respect to forensic fingerprint examination, there have "not been any studies
to establish how likely it is that partial prints taken from a crime scene will be a
match for only one set of finger prints in the world." Crisp, 324 F.3d at 273. "v\tnile
fingerprint examiners have long claimed the mantle of science so as to bolster the
credibility of their profession, the reality is that the fingerprint community has
never conducted any scientific testing to validate the premises upon which the field

is based. ''8 As one scholar noted, fingerprint science ultimately comes down to the
subjective interpretation of an examiner, but not to any solidified science:

"[W] here a method depends as heavily on subjective human judgment as does

the field"); State v. BuUerfieM, 27 P.3d 1133, 1142 (Utah 2001) (describing NRC
report as "authoritative"); Commonwealth v. Rosier, 685 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 1997)
(describing NRC report as "an authoritative scientific study"); Peopl.e v. Allen, 72
Cal.App.4th 1093, ll00 (Cal. App. 1999) (describing NRC report as "an
authoritative scientific study"); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 327 (Mo. 1996)
(describing NRC report as "authoritative"); Commonwealtlz v. B[y, 862 N.E.2d 341,
355 (Mass. 2007) (describing NRC report as "authoritative"); Peopl.e v. Wilson, 136
P.3d 864, 868 n. l (Cal. 2006) (describing NRC report as "authoritative"); see also
United States v. Dams, 602 F. Supp. 2d 658, 663 n.4 (D. Md. 2009) (noting that NRC
report on DNA is "widely regarded as one of the definitive publications on the use
of DNA evidence in the field of forensics"); United Stat,es v. Trala, 162 F. Supp. 2d
336, 351 (D. Del. 2001) ("Both the government and the defendant agree that the
NRC [report] is widely regarded as one of the definitive publications on the use of
DNA evidence in the field of forensics."); Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp.
12, 15 (D. Mass. 1995) ("The most authoritative assessments of the health effects
on humans of ionizing radiation are the periodic reports issued by the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences ....").
8 Robert Epstein, "Fmgerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint Science Is
Revealed," S. Cal L Rev. 75 (2001): 622,636.
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fingerprint examination-the method literally is the people who employ it."9 To
make matters worse, the fingerprint examiners' efforts "to create an error-free aura
around fingerprint identification ... ha[ve] the potential to dangerously mislead
finders of fact. "10
Latent prints typically suffer from a considerable degree of smudging,
blurring, and distortion because "[c]rime scene prints are unintentional, chance
prints for which there is no thought {or desire) to produce a clear reproduction." 11
The distortions in latent prints stem from a number of sources: {1) the surface upon
which the print is deposited can affect the quality of the print either because it is
less receptive to the deposit of a print in the first place, 12 or because it makes the

9 Jonathan].

Koehler, "Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They
Are and Why They Matter," Hastings Law Journal 59 {2008 2007): 1090 (footnotes
omitted).
10 Simon A. Cole, "More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint
Identification," Tu Journal of Criminal Law and Criminolno (1973-) 95, no. 3 (2005):
991.
11 John P. Nielson, "Rebutting the 'No Fingerprint' Defense," Prosecutor 39
(December 2005): 34; Andre A. Moenssens, Scimtifi,c Evidence in Ci:oil and Criminal
Cases (Foundation Press, 1995), 514..
12 David R Ashbaugh, Qy.antitati.ve-Q,ualitati:oe Friction Ri,dge Ana!,sis: An Introduction to
Basic and Advanced Ri,dgeowo (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, 1999), 124 ("various
substrates [swfaces] can cause distortion or interfere with the deposition of a print,
affecting its appearance and quality."); Nielson, "Rebutting the 'No Fingerprint'
Defense," 34 ("Objects that are extremely porous or are made using course fibers
prove to be poor receiving surfaces."); G. A. Fine, "A Review of the FBI's
Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case," Washington, DC: US Department ofJustice
Ojfice of the Inspector General, 2006, 103 ("One factor affecting the clarity of a latent
fingerprint is the surface or "substrate: upon which a latent fingerprint is
deposited.").
14

transfer of a print by law enforcement more complicated; 13 (2) the shape of the
ridges can be distorted or blurred by the amount of pressure used to deposit the
print; 14 (3) movement of the finger while the print was deposited can distort the
print, as "movement of the finger by a distance equal to the width of one furrow
between ridges (1 to 2/ l 00ths of an inch) is sufficient to blur a print beyond use; 15
(4) overlapping or "double tap" prints can "obscure details in each print; 16 (5)
prints can be compromised by materials that are either on the surface where the
print has been deposited, or on the finger or thumb of thumb itself; 17 and (6)

Nielson, "Rebutting the 'No Fingerprint' Defense," 34 ("If the surface is uneven,
only partial transfer will result leaving a print that is of no real value for
identification. If the surface is rough, fingerprint powder may become trapped in
the recesses causing such a loss of contrast as to obscure latent impressions.").
14 Ibid. ("Because blurring due to rotational, lateral or longitudinal movement,
deformation of the finger as it presses firmly against a surface typically causes some
distortion and edge blurring."); Ashbaugh, Qyanti.tatwe-QJµzlitat:ive Friction Rulge
Ana!Jsis, 123 (''Deposition pressure generally changes the shape of the friction ridge
by flattening or broadening each ridge.").
15 Nielson, ''Rebutting the 'No Fingexprint' Defense," 34 (citing problem of
"fingexprints deposited while the surface or hand was moving causing slippage and
resulting in only partial clarity"); Ashbaugh, Q_uanti.tatwe-QJµzlitat:ive Friction Rulge
Ana!Jsis, 125 ("pressure distortion takes place on the lateral or horizontal place
[and] is usually accompanied by sideways sliding of the friction ridges resulting in a
smearing or ridge matrix.").
16 Nielson, "Rebutting the 'No Fingerprint' Defense," 34; Ashbaugh, QyantitativeQy.alitat:ive Friction Ridge Ana!Jsis, 114; Fine, "A Review of the FBI's Handling of the
Brandon Mayfield Case," 103.
17 Ashbaugh, Q,uantitative-QJµzlitat:ive Friction Rul.ge Ana!Jsis, 116
("Dirty surstrates
[surfaces] may not accept all of the matrix [substance deposited by the fingertip]
available during deposition. The resulting print can appear blotchy, have areas
missing, or generally lack details."); Nielson, "Rebutting the 'No Fingerprint'
Defense," 36 ("Depositing surface interferences include any contaminant on the
friction ridges that hinders or prevents the deposit of fingerprint residue. For
instance, dirt, grease and other foreign matter can obliterate the fine detail that
must be present to effect an identification.").
13
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fingerprints are developed and transferred by a variety of methods, all of which
have the potential to cause distortions. 18 "Because of these factors, latent
fmgerprints are not perfect reproductions of the friction skin, even over a small
area.'' 19
Traditionally, examiners when comparing prints have looked for "ridge
characteristics,'' points along a particular ridge where something occurs: for
example, a ridge might come to an end, a "ridge ending," or bifurcate into two
ridges, a ''bifurcation."20
It is commonly believed that an average human fingerprint contains
between 75 and 175 ridge characteristics. 21 But there is no standard agreement
among fingerprint examiners as to either the precise number or nomenclature of
the different characteristics. 22 Given the typically small size of latent prints, and
given the amount of distortion that many latent prints suffer, fmgerprint examiners

18 Ashbaugh, Qgantitati:oe-Qualitatwe Friction Rulge Ana[ysis, 117 ("Improper
procedures, and especially efforts to correct those improper procedures, can cause
various alterations in the lifted print."); ibid., 117-18 (describing incident where
lifting tape caused alteration of several of the major ridge path deviations and error
was only discovered because print had been photographed prior to lifting); Fine,
"A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case," 103 ("Each
development medium can affect the appearance of a latent print and the accuracy
with which the details are reproduced.'').
19 Fine, "A Review of the FBl's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case," 104.
20 Ashbaugh, Quantitati:oe-Qgalitative Friction Rulge Ana[ysis, 141.
21 Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Law Enforcement Bulletin: An. Analysis of
Standards in Fingerprint Identification," June 1972, 1.
22 James F. Cowger, Fricti.on Ridge Skin: Comparison and Identjfication of Fingerprints
(Elsevier, 1983), 143 ("The terms used to define and describe these characteristics
vary markedly among writers in the field and differ even among examiners
depending upon the organization in which they were trained.").
16
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often are in the position of making identifications on the basis of very limited
information. 23 In many published decisions, for example, identifications were
made on less than fifteen common ridge characteristics, even though as discussed
above, a full fingerprint is thought to have between 75 and 200. 24
It has been well documented that different people can share a number of
fingerprint ridge characteristics in common.25 There have been no scientific·studies
performed that can reasonably serve to predict the probability of such events
occurring. During the course of the past century, about a dozen or so fingerprint
Fine, "A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case," 99 ("In
many latent prints, only a small fraction of the friction ridge detail on a complete
finger is reproduced."
24 United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1976) (fourteen points); Garrison
v. Smith, 413 F. Supp. 747, 761 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (twelve points); Magwoodv. State,
494 So.2d 124, 145 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (eleven points); R.amirez v. State, 542
So.2d 352, 353 (Fla. 1989) (ten points); Peopk v. Al.exander, 571 N.E.2d 1075, 1078
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (eleven and fourteen points); Peopk v. Garlin, 428 N.E.2d 697,
700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (twelve points); State v. Murdock, 689 P.2d 814, 819 (Kan.
1984) (twelve points); State v. Starks, 4 71 So.2d 1029, 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1985)
(twelve points); Peopk v. Jones, 344 N.W.2d 46, 46 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (ten
points); State v. Jones, 368 S.E.2d 844, 846 (N.C. 1988) (ten points); State v. Cepec,
1991 WL 57237, at *l (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (eleven points); Commonwealthv. Ware,
329 A.2d 258, 276 (Pa. 1974) (nine points); Commonwealth v. Hunter, 338 A.2d 623,
624 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (fourteen points); Commonwealth v. Walker, 116 A.2d 230,
234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (four points); State v. Awiis, 1999 WL 391372, at *7
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (eight points).
25 Y. Mark & D. Attias, What Is the Minimum Stmuiard of Characteristi.csfor Fingerprint
ldentificati.oni", 22 F'INGERPR. WHORID 148 (1996) (discussing prints from different
people with substantial similarity and recognizing that "an expert with many years
of experience behind him" could make a false identification when comparing two
such prints); JAMES W. 0STERBURG, THE CRIME LABORATORY: CA.SE STUDIES
OF SCIENTIFIC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 132 {1968) (discussing fingerprints
from different people with ten matching characteristics); Fine, "A Review of the
FBl's Handling," at 130 (recognizing the substantial similarity between a
fingerprint from Brandon Mayfield and a latent print deposited by another
person).
23
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probability models have been proposed. 26 "None of these [models] even
approaches theoretical adequacy, however, and none has been subjected to
empirical validations." 27 Consequently, "these models occupy no role in the routine
professional practice of fingerprint examination. " 28
Given the absence of probability studies, latent print examiners do not offer
opinions of identification in terms of probability. Instead, latent print examiners
make the claim of "absolute certainty" for their identifications. Examiners provide
an opinion that the latent print at issue was made by a particular finger to the
exclusion of all other fingerprints in the world. 29 Such assertions of absolute
certainty, however, are inherently unscientific. The National Academy of Sciences
concluded that such opinions of absolute certainty by fingerprint examiners are
plainly "unjustified."30
Having conducted an exhaustive and unprecedented examination of the
various forensic identification fields, including latent fingerprint analysis, the NAS
concluded that fingerprint examiners "have yet to establish either the validity of

David L Faigman, Modem Scimtifi,c Evulence: 17ze I.aw and Science ofExpert Testimony
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 2002), sec. 21-2.3.1, at 72; David A. Stoney and
John I. Thornton, "A Critical Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint Individuality
Models," Journal ofForensic Sciences 31, no. 4 (1986): 1193.
27 Faigrnan, Modem Scimtifi,c Evi.dence, sec. 21-2.3.1, at 72.
2B Ibid., sec. 21-2.3.1, at 72 (emphasis in original).
29 Fine, "A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case," 111
("FBI laboratory fingerprint examiners only express a conclusion of
individualization in terms of absolute certainty with a zero likelihood that the
latent fingerprint was made by a different person.").
30 Strengthening Forensic Scimce, 142.
26
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their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions. " 31 In reaching these dramatic
conclusions, the NAS specifically examined the standard ACE-V methodology
employed by fingerprint examiners. As the NAS recognizes, ACE-V provides only
a "broadly stated framework for conducing friction ridge analyses" and "is not
specific enough to qualify as a validated method ... " 32 The report provides
ACE-V does not guard against bias; is too broad to ensure
repeatability and transparency; and does not guarantee that two
analysts following it will obtain the same results. For these reasons,
merely following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that one is
proceeding in a scientific manner or producing reliable results. A
recent paper by Haber and Haber presents a thorough analysis of
the ACE-V method and its scientific validity. Their conclusion is
unambiguous: "We have reviewed available scientific evidence of the
validity of the ACE-V method and found none. " 33
The NAS also considered the claim of fingerprint examiners that "the
[ACE-VJ method, if followed correctly (i.e., by well-trained examiners properly
using the method) has a zero error rate." 34 In unambiguous language, the NAS
dismisses this assertion:
Clearly, this assertion is unrealistic, and moreover, it does not lead to
a process of method improvement. The method, and the
performance of those who use it, are inextricably linked, and both

Strengthening Forensic Science, 53; see also ibid., 102 ("Over the years the courts have
admitted fingerprint evidence, even though this evidence has made its way into the
courtroom without empirical validation of the underlying theory and/ or its
particular application.").
32 Strengthening Forensic Science, 142.
33 Ibid., 142-43; The NAS also notes that the "ACE-V method does not specify
particular measurements or a standard test protocol, and examiners must make
subjective assessments throughout." Ibid., 139.
34 Strengthening Forensic Science, 143.
31
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involve multiple sources of error (e.g., errors in executing the process
steps, as well as errors in human judgment).35
The NAS also recognized that the fundamental issue in latent fingerprint
analysis was not the uniqueness of each person's fingers, but the ability of
examiners to accurately make identifications from the small, distorted fragments of
fingerprints detected at crime scenes.36 As the NAS further explained,
Uniqueness and persistence are necessary conditions for friction
ridge identification to be feasible, but those conditions do not imply
that anyone can reliably discern whether or not two friction ridge
impressions were made by the same person. Uniqueness does not
guarantee that prints from two different people are always
sufficiently different that they cannot be confused, or that two
impressions made by the same finger will also be sufficiently similar
to be discerned as coming from the same source. The impression left
by a given finger will differ every time, because of inevitable
variations in pressure, which change the degree of contact between
each part of the ridge structure and the impression medium. None of
these variabilities--of features across a population of fingers or of
repeated impressions left by the same finger--has been
characterized, quantified, or compared. 37
The NAS thus recognized that to "properly underpin the process of friction
ridge identification, . . . research is needed into ridge flow and crease pattern
distributions on the hands and feet . . . and the discriminating value of the various
ridge formations and clusters of ridge formation" 38 Contrasting fingerprint analysis

Ibid.
36 Ibid., 43 ("The question is less a matter of whether each person's fingerprints are
permanent and unique - uniqueness is commonly assumed - and more a matter of
whether one can determine with adequate reliability that the finger that left an
imperfect impression at a crime scene is the same finger that left an impression
[with different imperfections in a file of fingerprints."].
37 Ibid., 144.
38 Ibid.
35
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with DNA evidence, the NAS observed that "population statistics for fingerprints
have not been developed, and friction ridge analysis relies on subjective judgments
by the examiner." 39 The NAS further recognized that, while "little research has
been directed toward developing population statistics, . . . more would be
feasible. "40
Given the lack of research that has been conducted in the fingerprint field,
the NAS explicitly stated that fingerprint examiners' routine claim-that they can
match a latent print to the one and only person in the entire world who produced
it--was "unjustified." 41 As the NAS explained,
At present, fingerprint examiners typically testify in the language of
absolute certainty. Both the conceptual foundations and the
professional norms of latent fingerprinting prohibit experts from
testifying to identification unless they believe themselves certain that
they have made a correct match. Experts therefore make the claim
that they have matched the latent print to the one and only person in
the entire world whose fingertip could have produced it ... Given the
general lack of validity testing for fingerprinting; the relative dearth
of difficult proficiency tests; the lack of a statistically valid model of
fingerprinting; and the lack of validated standards for declaring a
match, such claims of absolute, certain confidence in identification
are unjustified.42
Thus, as the NAS recognized, fingerprint analysis has not been "shown to have the
capacity of consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a

Ibid., 139.
Ibid., 139-40.
41 Ibid., 142; quoting Jennifer L. Mnookin, ''Validity of Latent Fingerprint
Identification: The Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate," law, Prob. & Risk 7
(2008): 127.
42 Strengthening Forensic Science, 142.
39
40

21

connection between evidence [i.e, a latent print] and a specific individual or
source. " 43
While defense counsel did not present this massive body of research to the
court-nor did he challenge the fingerprint finding itself-he did alert the cow-t to

this issue, observing that fingerprint evidence is not conclusive and that it lacked
proper standards. R. 298. Therefore, the court could not take the fingerprint
evidence as a given match to Mr. Cowlishaw. If anything, the court could have
seen it as potential evidence linked to Mr. Cowlishaw, but not as proof.
But even if the fingerprints belonged to Mr. Cowlishaw, they do not
establish that he committed the crime. The fingerprints merely establish that he
touched the car's window at some point and that a cup he touched was in the car.
Absent evidence identifying him as the perpetrator, which never happened here,
the fingerprints become meaningless. See discussion point I.B., infra.
For these reasons, the State insufficiently proved that Mr. Cowlishaw
committed any of these offenses because it failed to establish his identity. The court
erred in failing to dismiss these charges.
B. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT MR. COWLISHAW
COMMITTED A THEFT OF A VEfilCLE WHEN THE ONLY
EVIDENCE TYING HIM: TO THE THEFT WERE ms
FINGERPRINTS

The State presented two pieces of evidence supporting a car theft. Mr. Saad
testified that his car was taken while he went into his office. R. 230-31. He did not

43

Ihi.d., 7.
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see who took the car, however. R. 234. The only other evidence was Mr.
Cowlishaw's fingerprints. R. 287-89. But those fingerprints do not establish that
Mr. Cowlishaw took the vehicle. No witness testified as to how the car came into
Mr. Cowlishaw's possession.

If fingerprint evidence alone can be sufficient to convict one of a theft of a
vehicle, then any innocent person could be convicted if she happens to merely
touch a stolen vehicle. Instead, the State must produce some evidence to meet the
elements of the offense. Here, the State must show that Mr. Cowlishaw had the
"intent to deprive" Saad of his motor vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(defendant must have the "purpose to deprive" the owner of his property); Staie v.

Comish, 568 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1977).
This case is similar a case in which the Utah Supreme Court found
insufficient evidence. In State v. Franks, the defendant was stopped for a traffic
violation and subsequently arrested. State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 1982).
When officers searched the impounded vehicle, they found title belonging to
someone else. Id. Officers contacted the owners, who came and recovered their
car. Id. The court found insufficient evidence to support the theft charge, since the
State failed to prove that the defendant's use of the vehicle was not authorized. Id.
Here, while Saad did not know Mr. Cowlishaw or allow him to take his car,
there was no evidence that Mr. Cowlishaw in fact drove the vehicle, as discussed

supra. But even more importantly, even had he done so, there is no evidence that
Mr. Cowlishaw was the person who took the vehicle at the office. His prints could
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have arrived there at any time after. For example, Jones could have taken the
vehicle or anyone else for that matter. If that person represented to Mr. Cowlishaw
that he could drive the vehicle, then Mr. Cowlishaw would have lacked the
requisite intent-a purpose to deprive the owner of the vehicle. Critically, the
fingerprint evidence says absolutely nothing about intent. See Stat,e v. Morrell, 89
Utah 498, 118 P. 215 ( 1911) (insufficient evidence for a theft where defendant
lacked the intent to take property).
Nor did the State present any evidence that Mr. Cowlishaw stole the car.
The only evidence they presented was a statement of Mr. Cowlishaw's that "I've
been stealing vehicles since I was 17." R. 208. But this statement came when the
officer said Mr. Cowlishaw was "extremely high" "just saying crazy off the wall

things," such as that the officer was "being controlled by the government with
microchips and radiation." R. 208. This statement does not qualify as an
admission that Mr. Cowlishaw took a vehicle.
This case nearly mirrors one in which the Utah Supreme Court found
insufficient evidence. In that case, a truck with a camper disappeared from a used
car lot. Stat,e v. George, 25 Utah 2d 330, 331, 481 P.2d 667, 667 (1971 ). About a
week later, two witnesses testified that the defendants brought the camper to their
place and that they found a buyer for it. Id.
"There was no evidence," the court said, "as to whether the defendants or
either of them or neither of them took the truck and camper, save by way of
inference from their presence when the camper was left and sold ... " Id. The court
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was left to "indulge an inference upon an inference that could lead but to
conjecture not justifying a conclusion that a theft was accomplished by both or
either of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of any
reasonable hypothesis other than theft." Id. Consequently, it reversed the
conviction.
Similarly, Mr. Cowlishaw's print was found on the vehicle, but there was no
testimony establishing that he took the car other than an "inference upon an
inference that could lead but to conjecture ... " Id. The court had to infer that
because Mr. Cowlishaw's print was on the vehicle, he must have been driving it.
From there, it would have to infer that because he was driving, he must have taken
the vehicle from Saad. From there, it had to infer that he had the intent to steal the
vehicle. One's fingerprints are simply not enough to make the repeated inferential
chain.
Finally, the State never linked the two automobiles together. "[I] t is clear
that the State must definitely identify the goods found in the defendant's possession
as the goods which were charged to have been stolen before the jury may draw an
inference of guilt based upon the proof of possession by the defendant." Stat,e v.
Hall, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494, 496 (1944). Saad testified that he owned a "sky

blue" Nissan Versa and one officer said the car was blue. R. 148, 230. Yet Saad
never identified the crashed vehicle as his and three witnesses testified that the car
was silver or grey in color. R. 147, 196, 197-98, 212,223, 241, 243.
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The problem could have been fixed by simply asking Mr. Saad if the
recovered vehicle was in fact his. But the State would also have to correct the
inferenti.al chain by having Jones and officers identify the crashed vehicle as the
one she rode in and/ or the one they chased. But the State failed to take those
steps, and absent that effort, the court lacked sufficient evidence to convict Mr.
Cowlishaw of theft of a motor vehicle.

CONCLUSION
The court erred in convicting Mr. Cowlishaw when there were two
insufficiencies. First, there was no evidence that Mr. Cowlishaw was the person
who committed kidnapping or failing to respond to the police since no witness
identified him. Second, there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Cowlishaw
committed a theft of a vehicle when none of the evidence established that he
illegally took the car with the intent to steal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18 day of November, 2016.

/ s/ Samuel P. Newton
SAMUEL P. NEWTON
Attorney for the Defendant/ Appellant
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Tab A

ADDENDUMA
Constitutional Provisions

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
FIFrH AMENDMENT

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
SIXTH AMENDMENT

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defen(s)e.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, SECTION

1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

UTAH CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7. [DUE PROCESS OF LAW.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process oflaw.
ARTICLE I, SECTION

12. [RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify
in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.

Tab B

ADDENDUMB
Statutory Provisions

@>·

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. Theft -- Elements.
A person commits theft ifhe obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereo£

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence.
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a
defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged.

UtahR. Crim. P. 17(p)

(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all
the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense.
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Motion £or Directed Verdict

1

THE COURT:

2

Okay.

CLOSING ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL

3

MR. TREE:

Your Honor, you've received the evidence in

4

this case.

5

charges.

6

forward on two different theories, both of which the evidence

7

today supports both of those theories.

8
9

We have charged the defendant with three different
The first charge is that of kidnaping.

We're going

The first theory is that the defendant intentionally,
knowingly without authority of the law detained or restrained the

10

victim in this case, Rachel Jones, for any substantial period of

11

time.

12

Clinton and possibly even before, the defendant was restraining

13

her, detaining her, driving her around against her will.

14

asked him to take her home several times.

15

means to keep her with him.

16

home, but he continued against her will to drive throughout Davis

17

and Weber County, driving as she put it, very dangerously.

18

From -- she goes with him around 4:30 to 5, and she shows up at

19

the toll booth at 10:30.

20

In this case, the testimony was that at least beginning in

She

He had her phone as a

He made several promises to take her

The second theory is that he detained or restrained her

21

in circumstances exposing her to risk of bodily injury.

22

also -- the State has provided evidence to support that theory.

23

Specifically -- as your Honor is well aware, that bodily injury

24

is -- the definition of bodily injury is very slight physical

25

injury.

That

It doesn't require serious bodily injury or death; but
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1

certainly the ride just -- if we just look at nothing else but

2

the toll booth and the evading chase that he took Rachel on, that

3

in and of itself would satisfy the kidnaping under that theory.

4

I'll just play this for just a moment, your Honor.

5

(Video plays in open court)

6

If you remember, your Honor, at this point the defendant

7

says that he's not going to let this happen, this can't happen

8

and begins going at a high rate of speed down Adams Parkway.

9

lights, the siren -- the lights at this point are going 10:30 at

10

night, 10:50.

11

Here come the siren on.

12

The

There's a construction area before the hospital.

You can see the increase -- obvious increase in speed by

13

the defendant and by Deputy Green, flipping through these cones

14

are the first traffic light, and then the most -- the dangerous

15

one on 89.

16

almost 85 there following him, red light.

17

of Rachel that they were nearly hit in that intersection.

18

the defendant willfully or wantonly continues down the dead end

19

road, through the field and down the steep embankment.

20

As you can see the speed of Deputy Green got to

This

We heard the testimony
Then

from the toll both to the steep embankment

21

alone, the Court has been provided with enough facts that the

22

defendant had detained or restrained the victim in circumstances,

23

exposing her to risk of bodily injury.

24

driving pattern, his

25

had been doing prior to that starting in Clinton, and that the

Add to the fact his

the donuts, the dangerous driving that he
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Q

1

State has certainly met that on many different counts, has met

2

the burden on kidnaping under that theory.

3

theories the Court could find -- should find the defendant is

4

guilty of kidnaping.

But under both

5

The second charge that the Court -- the State has filed

6

is evading or failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop.

7

Obviously we just watched State's Exhibit -- I believe it was No.

8

32 where Deputy Green made both an audio and visual signal to the

9

defendant to stop, and he refused to stop.

He certainly did so

10

in a willful or wanton manner, and the other theory is he was

11

attempting to avoid law enforcement.

12

Finally, your Honor, the third charge that the State has

13

charged the defendant with is theft.

14

look at one of the most important pieces of evidence on

15

theft is Exhibit 24.

16

case that his vehicle was stolen sometime from 3:30 to 4.

17

had further testimony from Detective Colvin that the dispatch

18

report actually shows it was closer to 4:30.

19

When the defendant

we
on the

You had testimony from the victim in this
You

From the Bimbo Bakery, which is marked in State's

20

Exhibit 24, to just a little under a mile away from where Rachel

21

was at when the defendant took her for the ride of her life, she

22

said they left sometime between 4:30, 5.

23

going -- taking the vehicle, going and picking her up indicates

24

that he was the person that stole the motor vehicle.

25

Certainly the defendant

Then later on his actions, his fleeing from the police
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1

go -- only support and confirm that he was the one -- he knew

2

that the vehicle was stolen, that he had obtained unauthorized

3

control of the vehicle, and that he was trying to avoid detection

4

during that ride with Rachel.

5

Then finally, your Honor, one thing that had been raised

6

by the defense is the identify of the defendant.

7

the State has provided the Court with ample evidence to support

8

that the defendant was in fact the person that committed these

9

offenses.

I think that

The victim talked to the Court about her knowledge,

10

her acquaintance with the defendant.

11

then we have the fingerprint mat

12

the defendant was the individual in the vehicle at the time this

13

was all taking place.

14

Honor, the State has met its burden on all three counts.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BUSHELL:

17

THE COURT:

19

MR. BUSHELL:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. BUSHELL:

22

All right.

Thanks, Mr. Tree.

Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Bushell?

Judge, I too, have

May I turn this just a little bit?

Yes.
I don't want to (inaudible).

~

Yeah, no problem.
It's easier for me if I

(inaudible) like

this.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. BUSHELL:

25

comparison, which indicated

Taking all the evidence together, your

two distinct theories.

18

She ID'd him in court, and

That's fine.
I have also two distinct theories about

this case, maybe two separate defenses, and there are two that I
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1

would like to present to the Court for its consideration today.

2

The first is the defense of that this individual who sits before

3

you today was not involved in this case at all, the reason being

4

is that the evidence today simply didn't bear that out.

5

No one actually identified my client today.

6

not asked to point out and identify Preston Cowlishaw as the

7

individual she was with.

8

that's a typical tactic that defense -- I'm sorry, the

9

prosecutors to use to say is this the individual in the courtroom

Rachel was

I specifically noted that, because

10

today, where is he, then asks your Honor to take note on whether

11

or not that happened.

12

Rachel or for Sharon, the toll booth operator today, who had the

13

best opportunity to see my client, and neither was asked

14

specifically if this individual sitting here is the individual

15

involved in this case.

16

I wrote down that that was not done·for

Deputy Green did not see.

He testified that it was too

17

dark, and he couldn't even tell how many occupants were in the

18

vehicle as it was racing up Adams Avenue.

19

owned the vehicle, Mr. Saad, did not see or even know my client.

20

Deputy Aschinger did not see either.

21

The individual who

While there is some question about the fingerprints that

22

were found,

23

There is no real industry standard of how many marks -- let me

24

get the correct phraseology that was used here -- similarities or

25

points of comparison.

fingerprint evidence is not 100 percent conclusive.

Our CSI agent just testified if she gets
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1

over 10, that's usually good enough.

2

conclusive that that was his.

3

else's.

That's not 100 percent

It could have been somebody

4

One thing that I hit on early on was the scratches.

5

In the exhibits that the State provided there were two small

6

scratches that looked like they had been scabbed over, and to

7

me -- I'm not a scientist, I'm not a doctor -- looked like they

8

were older type of scratches, not freshly consistent with running

9

through thick scrub brush in the middle of the night, dark,

--

10

without a flashlight, going through that

11

described as steep, almost straight down.

12

around.

13

two dogs would just race through this type of foliage and be

14

scratched up a lot worse than what happened.

15

that area, which was
There were cactus

You would think that someone running away from cops with

One also final piece of evidence that was brought to our

16

attention today was that Rachel had no idea who the last name of

17

this individual was initially.

18

opportunities to provide that to the officers and never did.

19

fact,

20

to testify today.

21

She had two or three different
In

the individual who gave it to the officers wasn't even here

So our first argument is, your Honor, is that this

22

incident that occurred did not involve my client whatsoever.

23

the second theory is one where I place my client in a situation

24

where his guilt would be, I think, proven in Counts II and III of

25

the Information.

Now

The reason I'm doing this, your Honor, is
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1

because I believe that Count I, the kidnaping, is a more serious

2

of the three charges.

3

my client, there is another theory here that I think makes a lot

4

of sense as well for your Honor to consider.

5

As my calling allows to do what's best for

That is that Rachel and Preston knew each other, that a

6

car was taken.

7

sense.

8

this stolen vehicle, and they went out for the sole purpose of

9

using drugs.

10

You look how close the proximity was, it makes

Preston and Rachel decided to go out that evening, in

The reason I made such a big deal of trying to get in

11

and eventually getting in what Rachel was ultimately booked into

12

jail for was for warrants -- outstanding warrants for

13

paraphernalia and for possession or use of a controlled

14

substance.

15

Your Honor, the indi -- the exhibits that were presented

16

to us today by the State, specifically Exhibits 15, 16 -- I think

17

it was 15 and 16 -- show a vehicle that was not at all described

18

by Mr. Saad.

19

people are living in, that are using in.

20

everywhere.

21

These pictures look like you would see in cars that
Garbage strewn

My theory of this case is, your Honor, is that Rachel

22

and Preston went out, started using and drove around.

23

take what they're saying as truth, Rachel got picked up around

24

4:30, 5 o'clock.

25

only made one stop early on to get a pie and a cup of water.

If you

They drove around for six hours almost, and
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1

Mr. Saad testified that this garbage in his vehicle was

2

not there when it was stolen, so obviously there were some stops

3

made.

4

There's a nut bag.

5

garbage, consistent with making multiple stops.

6

There are Gatorade cups in here, there are plastic bags.
There's Powerade.

There's just a lot of

Rachel had numerous chances to leave.

I think there

7

were more than the two stops she talks about, the one at the

8

church and the one at the toll booth.

9

car proves that, that there were chances to get out.

What I

10

think happened here is these individuals were using.

They were

11

using pretty heavily.

12

hungry, they got thirsty, they stopped.

13

I think the garbage in the

They were driving around.

They get

We didn't get into it a whole lot, but there was a phone

14

call made.

Rachel had a chance to call her mom.

15

text made.

The officer testified he read that text, and that

16

looked like a text to come in and either sell some drugs or buy

17

some drugs.

18

There was a

This is a hard argument for me to make, your Honor,

19

because it does place my client directly in a stolen vehicle, and

20

it places him at the scene of the crash, but it doesn't give rise

21

to the kidnaping charge, which is the more serious of all of

22

these charges, because at this point, under our theory, Preston

23

Cowlishaw did not knowingly or intentionally or without authority

24

of law and against the will of the victim, Rachel Jones, detain

25

or restrain her for a substantial period.

She voluntarily went
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--

1

along.

2

word for it

3

there had to have been more than two stops.

4

ample opportunity to go into a store and buy these items.

She voluntarily got back in the car

5

--

if you take her

twice, but I think Exhibits 15 and 16 show that
There had to be

Or under subsection (b) of that, detain or restrain the

6

victim in circumstances exposing the victim to risk of bodily

7

injury.

8

her own accord, and while he was driving, my guess is

9

intoxicated, the use of drugs.

10

Two individuals out on a drug binge.

She was there on

It doesn't put her in that

situation where she falls under the level of a kidnaping.

11

This was a voluntary joy ride these individuals went on

12

to go out and to use narcotics, and as Mr. Tree indicated on that

13

vehicle where he's driving away and saying this isn't going to

14

happen, that makes sense for two individuals who are using drugs,

15

driving around in a vehicle for six plus hours to want to try and

16

get away.

17

Court is not agreeable to the first theory, I would ask the Court

18

to consider strongly the second theory in that my client is not

19

guilty of at least Count I of that Information, the kidnaping.

That's our theory of the case, your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. TREE:

All right.

Thanks, Mr. Bushell.

Thank you, your Honor.

If the

Mr. Tree?

Your Honor, the

--

22

necessity to have a formal identification as

23

talked about that when you talk about the individual, when you

24

speak to the witness as the defendant, as she mentioned him as

25

Preston several times, that formal identification by the witness

the Courts have
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1

is not necessary.

2

defendant.

3

several different times.

4

made, it was certainly made throughout her testimony as she

5

described what the defendant did to her.

6

Obviously in court she nodded towards the

She used his name.

We used the name defendant

If that formal identification wasn't

Additionally, Officer Green formally identified the

7

defendant as Preston Cowlishaw as the same individual they used

8

the fingerprints for, and that necessity that Mr. Bushell claims

9

that we have to do the formal identification is not necessary and

10

was not necessary in this case, given the totality of what

11

happened during the testimony of Ms. Jones.

12

Second, looking at the theory of the case that because

13

there's a lot of garbage in the vehicle, these two did drugs for

14

this entire time, there's no evidence of drug use found,

15

evidence of needles, drugs in the vehicle at all.

16

his theory certainly isn't supported.

17

you would see paraphernalia, you would see those things.

18

most -- the worst item that was found in the vehicle was

19

cigarettes.

20

a drug binge gone wrong.

21

no

That cer

Those kinds of things -The

Certainly nothing that would indicate that this was

Mr. Bushell talked about the victim's chances to leave.

22

I think she adequately explained why she kept going back with the

23

defendant, hoping, believing when he said, "Okay, I'll take you

24

home," that he would in fact take her home.

25

very surreal experience for her.

She was -- it was a

She had a hard time believing
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1

that he wasn't going to take her home,

2

her and drive around with her for -- until something like this

3

apparently happened.

4

that he was going to keep

As the State explained, even if you were to take

5

Mr. Bushell's theory at face value that she was knowingly with

6

him, certainly at the time they got to the toll booth, that

7

theory goes down the drain.

8

saw that door open,

9

look on her face.

The second that vehicle stopped you

you saw her go into the office.

You saw the

You saw her looking around, looking for help.

10

She ends up back in the car, but even though she ended up back in

11

the car, that ride during the evading was against her will.

12

asked him several times to stop.

She

13

He did detain or restrain her in circumstances, exposing

14

her to risk of bodily injury, going at the speeds he went through

15

that narrow construction zone, through the stop lights and

16

through 89, and then darting over the embankment at the end of

17

the road.

18

defendant did kidnap her under the definition provided under the

19

law.

20

All of those things are indicative of that the

THE COURT:

Thank you.

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Tree.

21

All right.

22

I'm ready to rule on the case, though.

23

taking it under advisement.

24

and the arguments, I'm prepared to deal with the case.

25

I appreciate the arguments and the evidence.

I think

I was thinking about

I think after hearing the testimony

Let me deal with them in reverse order, because I do

-117-

0304

1

agree with Mr. Bushell.

2

kidnaping charge.

3

that Mr.

4

took place -- he noticed it sometime around 3:30 or 4 or 4:30 in

5

the afternoon.

6

I think the real tough issue here is the

One Count III, the theft,

there's no question

Saad discovered that somebody had taken his car.

It

He reported it.

There's no question that we've got -- his motor vehicle

7

was stolen, and as -- I think the defense raises an interesting

8

argument that Mr. Saad had never identified the car that we see

9

in the photographs 15, 16 and 17 as being his car.

While that's

10

true, I mean I -- it's -- you look not only at direct evidence,

11

but circumstantial.

12

that the police recovered here up in Ogden is the same car is the

13

fact that Mr. Saad was called and said, •we found your car.

14

up here in Ogden," and he came up and looked at it, and of course

15

he said he was completely totaled, which is consistent with the

16

condition of the car that we have in the photographs, Exhibits

17

15, 16 and 17.

18

To me,

the compelling evidence that the car

It's

So while he may not have identified the photographs,

I

19

think based on the totality of the evidence, there's no question

20

that the car that's recovered here in Ogden is the one that

21

Mr. Saad reported as being missing.

22

shown some of the photographs, and that he never made a clear

23

identification, but I -- but I'm just convinced that we're

24

talking about his vehicle being the one that was recovered that

25

had been totaled.

So as I recall, he was

So I think it's the same car, regardless of
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So no question that the car that we're talking about

1

that fact.

2

is the one that belonged,

3

at least in my mind, to Mr. Saad.

What ties the defendant into this, of course, is the

4

fingerprints.

5

fingerprints,

6

one on the cup that's near the console inside.

7

Ms. McKenzie as a CSI is that she's -- it was her opinion that

8

these fingerprints belong to the defendant.

9

there's any question that the defendant was the one involved in

As I recall, there were three different
two on the window on the driver's side, and then
The testimony of

So I don't think

10

the theft of this motor vehicle based on the location of the

11

fingerprints.

12

The other argument that the victim has never identified

13

him here in the courtroom, again, while she may not have come out

14

and made an identification, she said the man that was driving the

15

car was Preston.

16

first name is Preston.

17

and made a formal identification in court, I think when you

18

couple the fingerprints and both of them being in the car, and

19

him having the name Preston, I think that's enough to establish

20

the identification.

21

the State has proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt on Count

22

III, the theft charge.

23

Well, it just so happens that the defendant's
So while she may not have pointed to him

So I don't think there's any question that

The same is pretty much true on the failure to respond

24

to a police officer's signal.

25

video, the dash cam video.

All you have to do is look at the

There's no question that on June 24 th
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1

somebody was operating the vehicle.

2

audible signal from a peace officer to bring the vehicle to a

3

stop.

4

clearly a willful or wanton disregard of the signal, running stop

5

signs, running red lights.

6

conduct, this action endangered the operation of the vehicle or

7

person, and it was an attempt to flee or allude.

8

ties the defendant into this criminal conduct is the

9

fingerprints, and also I think the testimony of Ms. Jones.

10

They received a visual or

There's no question that based on what I saw that it was

There's no question that this

Again, what

It is a difficult call on Count I, at least raises some

11

concern on the kidnaping charge, but here's

12

what I believe from the evidence that I've heard, is first of

13

all, you have the testimony of Ms. Jones.

14

knew the defendant, Preston.

15

had met him a couple of times.

16

think there's any question that initially she got in that car

17

voluntarily.

18

because they were just going for a ride, then I would find the

19

defendant not guilty.

20

here's what I --

She testified that she

She didn't know him real well.

She

He wasn't a stranger, and I don't

If that had been the situation all the way through

But according to her testimony, something changed.

21

Something happened in the course of that period of time from 3:30

22

or 4 until about 11 o'clock at night.

23

took her cell phone and said it was a distraction, that she

24

wasn't focused.

25

There was just something bizarre about Preston, his behavior.

She said at one point he

She said, "I became afraid.

I was concerned.n
I
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1

don't know what caused that.

2

was drugs or it wasn't drugs.

3

I have no idea, because there isn't any evidence, but Ms.

4

just said his behavior was strange and bizarre.

5

have been her words, but that was the conclusion I

6

that somehow his behavior become different as the night wore on.

I

don't have any evidence that it
I don't

--

alcohol was involved.

7

So he takes her phone away.

8

reckless, the way he was driving was strange.

9

became concerned for my own safety."

10

Jones

That may not
reached is

She said his driving was
She said, "I

She tried to call home at

one time, nobody answered.

11

Then I -- we have the testimony, and nobody really

12

talked about it.

13

looked at her cell phone, and that there was this message on the

14

cell phone that said, "Help, I'm being kidnaped or I'm being

15

held," or something like that, which I thought that was pretty

16

significant that there's a message.

17

thought the officer testified that he looked at her cell phone

18

and there was this message about, "Help, I've been kidnaped," on

19

her cell phone.

20

I thought one of the officers said that he

Maybe I got it wrong, but I

I thought that was a pretty significant piece of

21

evidence, because it goes to her state of mind at the time of the

22

incident.

23

didn't follow those requests or instructions, and continued to go

24

from Salt Lake all the way up here to Ogden.

25

She told him several times she wanted to go home.

He

So you have the testimony of Ms. Jones, but it's not
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1

just her testimony that I thought was critical.

2

key to the kidnaping came from the testimony of the lady who ran

3

the toll booth, because her testimony to a large extent

4

corroborates what Ms. Jones said.

5

the -- I don't know, maybe she was on drugs or alcohol.

6

she wasn't, but I don't even need to get there because I've got

7

the testimony of the toll booth operator, and she said, "Yeah,

8

I -- they pulled up to the toll booth, and this young girl jumps

9

out on the passenger side and runs into the office," and she

10

said, "It was strange.

11

here."

12

I thought the

I know the defense feels like
She said

I didn't know what I had in front of me

The other thing she said there -- as I noticed the girl,

13

she said, "There was something about her body language."

14

we've all seen it in different incidents.

15

it's how you react.

16

said,

17

something was wrong."

18

very concerned."

19

distressed girl."

20

language.

It's not what you say,

She said that when she looked at her, she

"I could see fear.

21

I know

I could see fear, and I knew that

She said, "I became very distressed or

She said, "What I saw in front of me was a
Again, I think that goes back to the body

Anyway, the toll booth lady, you've got to give her

22

credit.

23

on here, and she couldn't put her finger on it, but it was just

24

so bizarre, so strange.

25

arrive, and we've got the high speed chase and the crash.

I mean she calls 911.

There was something unusual going

So she calls 911, and then the police
They
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1

find the victim,

2

me

3

it was just over the crash.

4

entire incident.

and I think the officer said that she seemed to

Ms. Jones seemed to be very upset.

5

So -- and I don't think

It was over the whole episode or the

So anyway, based on that evidence, I am convinced that

6

the State has met the burden of proof on the kidnaping charge.

7

So in summary, the Court will find the defendant, Mr. Cowlishaw,

8

guilty on all three counts.

9

burden of proof in this case beyond a reasonable doubt.

10
11

All right.

Do we need -- anything else that I need to

address?

12

13

I'll find that the State has met the

MR. BUSHELL:

Maybe just a sentencing date on these,

your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

I was just going to get to that, and I just

15

didn't know if I hadn't met -- or had to deal with any other

16

issues.

17

MR. BUSHELL:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BUSHELL:

20

THE COURT:

21

22
23
24

25

No.
So -I don't believe so.
All right.

Let's -- what are we looking at,

Monica, about 45 days for
COURT CLERK:

We either have the May 25~ date or

(inaudible) June 1".
MR. BUSHELL:
conference.

June 1 st is the start of that drug court

I'll be gone.
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